Measuring the perception and metacognition of time.

The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender and personality of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe and model the results of a paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behavior to the underlying theory. We also describe a hierarchical Bayesian measurement model that performs a quantitative analysis of the trial-by-trial data calculating the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing direct comparison between an actual and an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750 ms (bisecting 1500 ms) and 1500 ms (bisecting 3000 ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (visual, audio, and audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.

Visual Perception Principles in Constellation Creation.

Many cultures share common constellations and common narratives about the stars in the night sky. Previous research has shown that this overlap in asterisms, minimal star groupings inside constellations, is clearly present across 27 distinct culture groups and can be explained in part by properties of individual stars (brightness) and properties of pairs of stars (proximity) (Kemp, Hamacher, Little, & Cropper, 2022). The same work, however, found no evidence that properties of triples (angle) and quadruples (good continuation) predicted constellation formation. We developed a behavioral experiment to explore how individuals form constellations under conditions that reduce cultural learning. We found that participants independently selected and connected similar stars, and that their responses were predicted by two properties of triples (angle and even spacing) in addition to the properties of brightness and proximity supported by previous work. Our findings lend further evidence to the theory that commonality of constellations across cultures is not a result of shared human history but rather stems from shared human nature.

Perceptual Grouping Explains Similarities in Constellations Across Cultures.

Cultures around the world organize stars into constellations, or asterisms, and these groupings are often considered to be arbitrary and culture specific. Yet there are striking similarities in asterisms across cultures, and groupings such as Orion, the Big Dipper, the Pleiades, and the Southern Cross are widely recognized across many different cultures. Psychologists have informally suggested that these shared patterns are explained by Gestalt laws of grouping, but there have been no systematic attempts to catalog asterisms that recur across cultures or to explain the perceptual basis of these groupings. Here, we compiled data from 27 cultures around the world and found that a simple computational model of perceptual grouping accounts for many of the recurring cross-cultural asterisms. Our results suggest that basic perceptual principles account for more of the structure of asterisms across cultures than previously acknowledged and highlight ways in which specific cultures depart from this shared baseline.

Dynamic face processing impairments are associated with cognitive and positive psychotic symptoms across psychiatric disorders.

Impairments in social cognition-including recognition of facial expressions-are increasingly recognised as a core deficit in schizophrenia. It remains unclear whether other aspects of face processing (such as identity recognition) are also impaired, and whether such deficits can be attributed to more general cognitive difficulties. Moreover, while the majority of past studies have used picture-based tasks to assess face recognition, literature suggests that video-based tasks elicit different neural activations and have greater ecological validity. This study aimed to characterise face processing using video-based stimuli in psychiatric inpatients with and without psychosis. Symptom correlates of face processing impairments were also examined. Eighty-six psychiatric inpatients and twenty healthy controls completed a series of tasks using video-based stimuli. These included two emotion recognition tasks, two non-emotional facial identity recognition tasks, and a non-face control task. Symptoms were assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Schizophrenia and bipolar disorder groups were significantly impaired on the emotion-processing tasks and the non-face task compared to healthy controls and patients without psychosis. Patients with other forms of psychosis performed intermediately. Groups did not differ in non-emotional face processing. Positive symptoms of psychosis correlated directly with both emotion-processing performance and non-face discrimination across patients. We found that identity processing performance was inversely associated with cognition-related symptoms only. Findings suggest that deficits in emotion-processing reflect symptom pathology independent of diagnosis. Emotion-processing deficits in schizophrenia may be better accounted for by task-relevant factors-such as attention-that are not specific to emotion processing.

Naming unrelated words predicts creativity.

Several theories posit that creative people are able to generate more divergent ideas. If this is correct, simply naming unrelated words and then measuring the semantic distance between them could serve as an objective measure of divergent thinking. To test this hypothesis, we asked 8,914 participants to name 10 words that are as different from each other as possible. A computational algorithm then estimated the average semantic distance between the words; related words (e.g., cat and dog) have shorter distances than unrelated ones (e.g., cat and thimble). We predicted that people producing greater semantic distances would also score higher on traditional creativity measures. In Study 1, we found moderate to strong correlations between semantic distance and two widely used creativity measures (the Alternative Uses Task and the Bridge-the-Associative-Gap Task). In Study 2, with participants from 98 countries, semantic distances varied only slightly by basic demographic variables. There was also a positive correlation between semantic distance and performance on a range of problems known to predict creativity. Overall, semantic distance correlated at least as strongly with established creativity measures as those measures did with each other. Naming unrelated words in what we call the Divergent Association Task can thus serve as a brief, reliable, and objective measure of divergent thinking.

Trauma and the content of hallucinations and post-traumatic intrusions in first-episode psychosis.

OBJECTIVE: Increasing evidence suggests experiences of childhood trauma may be causally related to the development of hallucinations. Cognitive theories of psychosis suggest post-traumatic intrusions to be a primary mechanism in this relationship. These theories predict that the content of hallucinations will be related to traumatic experiences; however, few studies have investigated this. This study examined the relationship between childhood trauma, the content of hallucinations, and the content of post-traumatic intrusions in a sample with first-episode psychosis. METHODS: Sixty-six young people aged 15-25 experiencing a first episode of psychosis were recruited from an early intervention service. Participants completed assessments of traumatic experiences, hallucination content, and post-traumatic intrusion content using a systematic coding frame. The coding frame assessed for three types of relationships between traumatic experiences, the content of hallucinations, and the content of post-traumatic intrusions: direct relationships (hallucination content exactly matching the trauma/intrusion), thematic relationships (hallucinations with the same themes as the trauma/intrusion), and no relationship (hallucination and trauma/intrusion content unrelated). RESULTS: Of those people who reported trauma and hallucinations (n = 36), 22 of these (61%) experienced post-traumatic intrusions, and of these, 16 (73%) experienced hallucinations that were directly or thematically related to their post-traumatic intrusions. Twelve people experienced hallucination content directly related to their trauma, six of whom (50%) also had intrusions relating to the same traumatic event as their hallucinations. CONCLUSIONS: The finding that some people experience hallucinations and post-traumatic intrusions relating to the same traumatic event supports theories proposing a continuum of memory intrusion fragmentation. These results indicate that early intervention services for young people with psychosis should provide assessment and intervention for trauma and PTSD and should consider the impact of past traumatic events on the content of current hallucinatory experience. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder should be assessed in those experiencing a first episode of psychosis. Interventions for trauma should be offered in early intervention for psychosis services. In a notable proportion of people, hallucination content is related to traumatic experiences. Clinical assessment and formulation of hallucinations requires consideration of how past traumatic events may be contributing to hallucinatory experience. It is important for clinicians to have an understanding of the phenomenological differences between hallucinations and post-traumatic intrusions when conducting clinical assessments with people with comorbid psychosis and PTSD.

Flowers in the Attic: Lateralization of the detection of meaning in visual noise.

The brain is a slave to sense; we see and hear things that are not there and engage in ongoing correction of these illusory experiences, commonly termed pareidolia. The current study investigates whether the predisposition to see meaning in noise is lateralized to one hemisphere or the other and how this predisposition to visual false-alarms is related to personality. Stimuli consisted of images of faces or flowers embedded in pink (1/f) noise generated through a novel process and presented in a divided-field paradigm. Right-handed undergraduates participated in a forced-choice signal-detection task where they determined whether a face or flower signal was present in a single-interval trial. Experiment 1 involved an equal ratio of signal-to-noise trials; experiment 2 provided more potential for illusionary perception with 25% signal and 75% noise trials. There was no asymmetry in the ability to discriminate signal from noise trials (measured using d') for either faces and flowers, although the response criterion (c) suggested a stronger predisposition to visual false alarms in the right visual field, and this was negatively correlated to the unusual experiences dimension of schizotypy. Counter to expectations, changing the signal-image to noise-image proportion in Experiment 2 did not change the number of false alarms for either faces and flowers, although a stronger bias was seen to the right visual field; sensitivity remained the same in both hemifields but there was a moderate positive correlation between cognitive disorganization and the bias (c) for "flower" judgements. Overall, these results were consistent with a rapid evidence-accumulation process of the kind described by a diffusion decision model mediating the task lateralized to the left-hemisphere.

A Novel Dynamic Morphed Stimuli Set to Assess Sensitivity to Identity and Emotion Attributes in Faces.

Face-based tasks are used ubiquitously in the study of human perception and cognition. Video-based (dynamic) face stimuli are increasingly utilized by researchers because they have higher ecological validity than static images. However, there are few ready-to-use dynamic stimulus sets currently available to researchers that include non-emotional and non-face control stimuli. This paper outlines the development of three original dynamic stimulus sets: a set of emotional faces (fear and disgust), a set of non-emotional faces, and a set of car animations. Morphing software was employed to vary the intensity of the expression shown and to vary the similarity between actors. Manipulating these dimensions permits us to create tasks of varying difficulty that can be optimized to detect more subtle differences in face-processing ability. Using these new stimuli, two preliminary experiments were conducted to evaluate different aspects of facial identity recognition, emotion recognition, and non-face object discrimination. Results suggest that these five different tasks successfully avoided floor and ceiling effects in a healthy sample. A second experiment found that dynamic versions of the emotional stimuli were recognized more accurately than static versions, both for labeling, and discrimination paradigms. This indicates that, like previous emotion-only stimuli sets, the use of dynamic stimuli confers an advantage over image-based stimuli. These stimuli therefore provide a useful resource for researchers looking to investigate both emotional and non-emotional face-processing using dynamic stimuli. Moreover, these stimuli vary across crucial dimensions (i.e., face similarity and intensity of emotion) which allows researchers to modify task difficulty as required.

Testing models of post-traumatic intrusions, trauma-related beliefs, hallucinations, and delusions in a first episode psychosis sample.

OBJECTIVE: There is increasing evidence that childhood trauma may play a role in the aetiology of psychosis. Cognitive models implicate trauma-related symptoms, specifically post-traumatic intrusions and trauma-related beliefs as primary mechanisms, but these models have not been extensively tested. This study investigated relationships between childhood trauma, psychotic symptoms (hallucinations and delusions), post-traumatic intrusions, and trauma-related beliefs while accounting for comorbid symptoms. METHODS: Sixty-six people with first episode psychosis aged between 15 and 24 years were assessed for hallucinations, delusions, childhood trauma, post-traumatic intrusions, post-traumatic avoidance, and trauma-related beliefs. RESULTS: Fifty-three per cent of the sample had experienced childhood trauma, and 27% met diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Both post-traumatic intrusions and trauma-related beliefs mediated the relationships between childhood trauma and hallucinations, and childhood trauma and delusions. Multiple regression analyses revealed that post-traumatic intrusions (but not childhood trauma, post-traumatic avoidance, or trauma-related beliefs) were independently associated with hallucination severity (ß = .53, p = .01). Post-traumatic intrusions and trauma-related beliefs (but not childhood trauma or post-traumatic avoidance) were independently associated with delusion severity (ß = .67, p < .01 and ß = .34, p < .01, respectively). CONCLUSIONS: These findings support cognitive models that implicate post-traumatic intrusions in hallucination aetiology, and post-traumatic intrusions and trauma-related beliefs in delusion aetiology. The results suggest that trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, including trauma-related beliefs, should be addressed in the assessment and treatment of people with early psychosis. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, including trauma-related beliefs, should be addressed in the assessment and treatment of people with early psychosis. Routine assessment of childhood trauma and PTSD in clinical services dealing with young people with first episode psychosis is needed. These findings support cognitive models of trauma and hallucinations and delusions.

Individual differences in first- and second-order temporal judgment.

The ability of subjects to identify and reproduce brief temporal intervals is influenced by many factors whether they be stimulus-based, task-based or subject-based. The current study examines the role individual differences play in subsecond and suprasecond timing judgments, using the schizoptypy personality scale as a test-case approach for quantifying a broad range of individual differences. In two experiments, 129 (Experiment 1) and 141 (Experiment 2) subjects completed the O-LIFE personality questionnaire prior to performing a modified temporal-bisection task. In the bisection task, subjects responded to two identical instantiations of a luminance grating presented in a 4deg window, 4deg above fixation for 1.5 s (Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). Subjects initiated presentation with a button-press, and released the button when they considered the stimulus to be half-way through (750/1500 ms). Subjects were then asked to indicate their 'most accurate estimate' of the two intervals. In this way we measure both performance on the task (a first-order measure) and the subjects' knowledge of their performance (a second-order measure). In Experiment 1 the effect of grating-drift and feedback on performance was also examined. Experiment 2 focused on the static/no-feedback condition. For the group data, Experiment 1 showed a significant effect of presentation order in the baseline condition (no feedback), which disappeared when feedback was provided. Moving the stimulus had no effect on perceived duration. Experiment 2 showed no effect of stimulus presentation order. This elimination of the subsecond order-effect was at the expense of accuracy, as the mid-point of the suprasecond interval was generally underestimated. Response precision increased as a proportion of total duration, reducing the variance below that predicted by Weber's law. This result is consistent with a breakdown of the scalar properties of time perception in the early suprasecond range. All subjects showed good insight into their own performance, though that insight did not necessarily correlate with the veridical bisection point. In terms of personality, we found evidence of significant differences in performance along the Unusual Experiences subscale, of most theoretical interest here, in the subsecond condition only. There was also significant correlation with Impulsive Nonconformity and Cognitive Disorganisation in the sub- and suprasecond conditions, respectively. Overall, these data support a partial dissociation of timing mechanisms at very short and slightly longer intervals. Further, these results suggest that perception is not the only critical mitigator of confidence in temporal experience, since individuals can effectively compensate for differences in perception at the level of metacognition in early suprasecond time. Though there are individual differences in performance, these are perhaps less than expected from previous reports and indicate an effective timing mechanism dealing with brief durations independent of the influence of significant personality trait differences.

Once more with feeling: Normative data for the aha experience in insight and noninsight problems.

Despite the presumed ability of insight problems to elicit the subjective feeling of insight, as well as the use of so-called insight problems to investigate this phenomenon for over 100 years, no research has collected normative data regarding the ability of insight problems to actually elicit the feeling of insight in a given individual. The work described in this article provides an overview of both classic and contemporary problems used to examine the construct of insight and presents normative data on the success rate, mean time to solution, and mean rating of aha experience for each problem and task type. We suggest using these data in future work as a reference for selecting problems on the basis of their ability to elicit an aha experience.

Shared processing in multiple object tracking and visual working memory in the absence of response order and task order confounds.

To understand how the visual system represents multiple moving objects and how those representations contribute to tracking, it is essential that we understand how the processes of attention and working memory interact. In the work described here we present an investigation of that interaction via a series of tracking and working memory dual-task experiments. Previously, it has been argued that tracking is resistant to disruption by a concurrent working memory task and that any apparent disruption is in fact due to observers making a response to the working memory task, rather than due to competition for shared resources. Contrary to this, in our experiments we find that when task order and response order confounds are avoided, all participants show a similar decrease in both tracking and working memory performance. However, if task and response order confounds are not adequately controlled for we find substantial individual differences, which could explain the previous conflicting reports on this topic. Our results provide clear evidence that tracking and working memory tasks share processing resources.

Insight Is Not in the Problem: Investigating Insight in Problem Solving across Task Types.

The feeling of insight in problem solving is typically associated with the sudden realization of a solution that appears obviously correct (Kounios et al., 2006). Salvi et al. (2016) found that a solution accompanied with sudden insight is more likely to be correct than a problem solved through conscious and incremental steps. However, Metcalfe (1986) indicated that participants would often present an inelegant but plausible (wrong) answer as correct with a high feeling of warmth (a subjective measure of closeness to solution). This discrepancy may be due to the use of different tasks or due to different methods in the measurement of insight (i.e., using a binary vs. continuous scale). In three experiments, we investigated both findings, using many different problem tasks (e.g., Compound Remote Associates, so-called classic insight problems, and non-insight problems). Participants rated insight-related affect (feelings of Aha-experience, confidence, surprise, impasse, and pleasure) on continuous scales. As expected we found that, for problems designed to elicit insight, correct solutions elicited higher proportions of reported insight in the solution compared to non-insight solutions; further, correct solutions elicited stronger feelings of insight compared to incorrect solutions.

You Don't See What I See: Individual Differences in the Perception of Meaning from Visual Stimuli.

Everyone has their own unique version of the visual world and there has been growing interest in understanding the way that personality shapes one's perception. Here, we investigated meaningful visual experiences in relation to the personality dimension of schizotypy. In a novel approach to this issue, a non-clinical sample of subjects (total n = 197) were presented with calibrated images of scenes, cartoons and faces of varying visibility embedded in noise; the spatial properties of the images were constructed to mimic the natural statistics of the environment. In two experiments, subjects were required to indicate what they saw in a large number of unique images, both with and without actual meaningful structure. The first experiment employed an open-ended response paradigm and used a variety of different images in noise; the second experiment only presented a series of faces embedded in noise, and required a forced-choice response from the subjects. The results in all conditions indicated that a high positive schizotypy score was associated with an increased tendency to perceive complex meaning in images comprised purely of random visual noise. Individuals high in positive schizotypy seemed to be employing a looser criterion (response bias) to determine what constituted a 'meaningful' image, while also being significantly less sensitive at the task than those low in positive schizotypy. Our results suggest that differences in perceptual performance for individuals high in positive schizotypy are not related to increased suggestibility or susceptibility to instruction, as had previously been suggested. Instead, the observed reductions in sensitivity along with increased response bias toward seeing something that is not there, indirectly implicated subtle neurophysiological differences associated with the personality dimension of schizotypy, that are theoretically pertinent to the continuum of schizophrenia and hallucination-proneness.

Selective impairment of global motion integration, but not global form detection, in schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder.

Recent evidence suggests that schizophrenia is associated with impaired processing of global visual motion, but intact processing of global visual form. This project assessed whether preserved visual form detection in schizophrenia extended beyond low-level pattern discrimination to a naturalistic form-detection task. We assessed both naturalistic form detection and global motion detection in individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorder, bipolar affective disorder, and healthy controls. Individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorder and bipolar affective disorder were impaired relative to healthy controls on the global motion task, but not the naturalistic form-detection task. Results indicate that preservation of visual form detection in these disorders extends beyond configural forms to naturalistic object processing.

Transfer of learning between hemifields in multiple object tracking: memory reduces constraints of attention.

Many tasks involve tracking multiple moving objects, or stimuli. Some require that individuals adapt to changing or unfamiliar conditions to be able to track well. This study explores processes involved in such adaptation through an investigation of the interaction of attention and memory during tracking. Previous research has shown that during tracking, attention operates independently to some degree in the left and right visual hemifields, due to putative anatomical constraints. It has been suggested that the degree of independence is related to the relative dominance of processes of attention versus processes of memory. Here we show that when individuals are trained to track a unique pattern of movement in one hemifield, that learning can be transferred to the opposite hemifield, without any evidence of hemifield independence. However, learning is not influenced by an explicit strategy of memorisation of brief periods of recognisable movement. The findings lend support to a role for implicit memory in overcoming putative anatomical constraints on the dynamic, distributed spatial allocation of attention involved in tracking multiple objects.

The categorisation of non-categorical colours: a novel paradigm in colour perception.

In this paper, we investigate a new paradigm for studying the development of the colour 'signal' by having observers discriminate and categorize the same set of controlled and calibrated cardinal coloured stimuli. Notably, in both tasks, each observer was free to decide whether two pairs of colors were the same or belonged to the same category. The use of the same stimulus set for both tasks provides, we argue, an incremental behavioural measure of colour processing from detection through discrimination to categorisation. The measured data spaces are different for the two tasks, and furthermore the categorisation data is unique to each observer. In addition, we develop a model which assumes that the principal difference between the tasks is the degree of similarity between the stimuli which has different constraints for the categorisation task compared to the discrimination task. This approach not only makes sense of the current (and associated) data but links the processes of discrimination and categorisation in a novel way and, by implication, expands upon the previous research linking categorisation to other tasks not limited to colour perception.

Visually tracking and localizing expanding and contracting objects.

The maintenance of attention on moving objects is required for cognition to reliably engage with the visual world. Theories of object tracking need to explain on which patterns of visual stimulation one can easily maintain attention and on which patterns one cannot. A previous study has shown that it is easier to track rigid objects than objects that expand and contract along their direction of motion, in a manner that resembles a substance pouring from one location to another (vanMarle and Scholl 2003 Psychological Science 14 498-504). Here we investigate six possible explanations for this finding and find evidence supporting two of them. Our results show that, first, objects that expand and contract tend to overlap and crowd each other more, and this increases tracking difficulty. Second, expansion and contraction make it harder to localize objects, even when there is only a single target to attend to, and this may also increase tracking difficulty. Currently, there is no theory of object tracking that can account for the second finding.

Summation of visual motion across eye movements reflects a nonspatial decision mechanism.

Human vision remains perceptually stable even though retinal inputs change rapidly with each eye movement. Although the neural basis of visual stability remains unknown, a recent psychophysical study pointed to the existence of visual feature-representations anchored in environmental rather than retinal coordinates (e.g., "spatiotopic" receptive fields; Melcher and Morrone, 2003). In that study, sensitivity to a moving stimulus presented after a saccadic eye movement was enhanced when preceded by another moving stimulus at the same spatial location before the saccade. The finding is consistent with spatiotopic sensory integration, but it could also have arisen from a probabilistic improvement in performance due to the presence of more than one motion signal for the perceptual decision. Here we show that this statistical advantage accounts completely for summation effects in this task. We first demonstrate that measurements of summation are confounded by noise related to an observer's uncertainty about motion onset times. When this uncertainty is minimized, comparable summation is observed regardless of whether two motion signals occupy the same or different locations in space, and whether they contain the same or opposite directions of motion. These results are incompatible with the tuning properties of motion-sensitive sensory neurons and provide no evidence for a spatiotopic representation of visual motion. Instead, summation in this context reflects a decision mechanism that uses abstract representations of sensory events to optimize choice behavior.

The detection of the motion of contrast modulation: a parametric study.

Despite a long and productive history as a focus of research interest, the details of how humans detect motion in an image remain controversial. This debate has not been helped by the lack of a clear parametric description of motion discrimination for some of the more simple visual stimuli employed in the literature to date. With this in mind, in the present work, we examined a peculiarity observed in the perception of the motion of second-order (contrast-modulated) stimuli: Under certain stimulus conditions, there is a reversal in the perceived direction of motion of the pattern. The aim was to quantify this phenomenon, relate the reversal to forward (veridical) and ambiguous motion, and place the behavioral data in the context of the window of visibility model of spatiotemporal contrast sensitivity. The direction of motion of contrast-modulated patterns was measured as a function of temporal frequency and carrier contrast, under different critical stimulus conditions. The stimulus properties manipulated were spatial frequency, spatial-phase relationship of carrier and sidebands, color, duration, and, most critically, the retinal location of the stimulus. On a purely empirical basis, the data reconciled several conflicts in the recent literature. From a theoretical standpoint, the data were well explained by the window of visibility approach in the majority of conditions and were partially explained in the remaining conditions. The results raise some interesting questions about underlying motion detection mechanisms and the assumptions embodied in our approach to motion modeling and the visual system in general. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from app.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.